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A NEW WAY FORWARD: A RESPONSE TO 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN 
 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch* 
Mass tort litigation is rife with trade-offs.  For instance, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys need to amass clients to achieve 
economies of scale and bring effective litigation, but an 
inventory of clients creates an attenuated attorney-client 
relationship.1  That nontraditional relationship tends to make 
clients ineffective monitors because they have little 
substantive input over how their attorney handles their case.  
Plus, attorneys must focus on achieving the best result for 
their clients in the aggregate.  This breeds standard collective 
action problems including conflicts between the self-interest of 
the group members and the group as a whole. 
When large-scale litigation proceeds outside of formal 
Rule 23 class certification—as is frequently the case after the 
Class Action Fairness Act—it lacks the judicial quality control 
measures that class certification affords.2  Those measures 
include appointing class counsel, ensuring a fair settlement, 
and authorizing attorneys’ fees.3  Without such measures, the 
trade-offs, tensions, and problems multiply.  Broadly 
conceived, these problems fall into three categories: agency 
problems between attorneys and their clients, group problems 
between plaintiffs and other plaintiffs, and competition 
problems between plaintiffs’ attorneys and other plaintiffs’ 
attorneys.4  At the core of these problems lies the principal 
 
 *  Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. 
 1 See generally Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government Of, By, and For the 
People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 172–74 (2008) 
(discussing the advantages plaintiffs gain by litigating in a group). 
 2 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2517, 2531 (2008); Weinstein, supra note 1, at 173. 
 3 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (e), (g), (h). 
 4 These problems are just the tip of the iceberg.  As I have observed before, these problems 
incite deeper institutional questions such as: 
C A R D O Z O  L A W  R E V I E W  
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tension, the tension between efficiently resolving mass 
litigation to maximize social welfare on one hand, and aiming 
to afford individual justice to litigants on the other.  Put 
differently, where we draw the line and what we emphasize in 
debating these trade-offs largely depends on whether we value 
individual justice or welfare maximization. 
Judge Jack Weinstein highlights this tension in his 
Cardozo De Novo article, Preliminary Reflections on 
Administration of Complex Litigations.5  In reading his 
Article, two things struck me: (1) the extent to which we 
perceive welfare maximization and individual justice as a 
dichotomy and rely on one perspective to explain and justify 
aggregation procedures, and (2) the need for judicial flexibility 
and creativity in approaching large-scale litigation, 
particularly in nonclass aggregation.6  As to the first point, 
entrenchment in these two perspectives has led scholars down 
what are now well-trodden paths to familiar debates.  But the 
very persistence of these debates indicates somewhat of a 
stalemate rather than a solution.  Accordingly, in my most 
recent article, Litigating Groups, I argued for a third approach 
derived from moral and political philosophy, as well as social 
psychology, that focuses on inclusion within the relevant 
community.7  This alternative theoretical framework identifies 
an important potential source for group unity: group members’ 
beliefs regarding their obligations to other group members.  It 
is through implementing this new approach that I address the 
second aspect of Judge Weinstein’s article, the need for 
creative handling. 
This brief Response thus divides into two parts.  Part I 
addresses the tension that Judge Weinstein observes in his 
opening paragraphs between “the somewhat academic search 
for perfection in achieving due process, development of 
substantive rules of law, and the court’s decision to meet the 
guideline of Rule One of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” 
 
how litigation risks and burdens should be distributed to achieve a fair balance of 
litigating power and avoid potentially serious social costs; what role, if any, should an 
economic cost-benefit analysis play in defining constitutionally protected procedural 
rights; why is it ever legitimate, in the name of enforcing procedural rights, for a court 
to substitute its own balance of costs and benefits for the balance already struck by a 
state legislature? 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1, 46 (2009). 
 5 Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on Administration of Complex Litigations, 2009 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1, 3. 
 6 See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 172. 
 7 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, ALABAMA L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359279. 
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which requires “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action.”8  Rather than addressing this tension through 
either traditional lens, Part I sets forth the theory and 
rationale behind an alternative “group responsibility” 
approach to nonclass aggregation.  It provides a condensed, 
easily accessible excerpt of the more extensive theoretical 
framework developed in Litigating Groups.9 
Part II responds to Judge Weinstein’s use of alternative 
judicial procedures, which he highlights with examples from 
Agent Orange,10 Asbestos,11 Diethylstilbestrol (DES),12 
Tobacco,13 Breast Implants,14 Guns,15 Zyprexa,16 and the New 
York Staten Island Ferry case.17  By employing creative 
approaches, advancing equitable concepts used by medieval 
institutions, and tailoring his methods to fit the unique 
aspects of each case, Judge Weinstein worked both with and 
without Rule 23.18  Drawing on similar equitable concepts and, 
in many ways, coming full circle to the medieval picture of the 
“community of the vil” painted by Stephen Yeazell,19 Part II 
provides preliminary details on implementing the theory 
described in Part I. 
 
I     PLAINTIFFS’ GROUPS: MEMBERSHIP AND OBLIGATIONS 
 
In addressing the group problems, competition problems, 
and agency problems produced by large-scale nonclass 
litigation, scholars and judges typically emphasize either the 
need to regulate conduct efficiently and deter wrongdoing to 
maximize social welfare or the need for individual autonomy 
and consent.20  Judge Weinstein, for example, tends toward 
 
 8 Weinstein, supra note 5, at 2. 
 9 Burch, supra note 7. 
 10 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 11 E.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 
In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 12 In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 13 E.g., Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d, 
McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 14 In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 15 E.g., City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); 
NAACP v. Acusport Corp., 226 F. Supp. 2d 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 16 E.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig. 253 F.R.D. 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 17 McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); In re City of New York, 
475 F. Supp. 2d 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 18 Weinstein, supra note 5, at 5. 
 19 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION (1987). 
 20 For examples of those who tend to emphasize individual autonomy, see Richard A. 
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the former group, with his opinions and scholarship reflecting 
both his pragmatic and his humanist side.21  In Litigating 
Groups, I suggested a third approach based on group 
responsibility.  It contends that groups of plaintiffs may have 
(or could be encouraged to develop) organic or indigenous 
origins such that social norms and moral obligations provide 
an internally coercive force keeping litigants together.  It 
thereby mitigates the group problems that arise when some 
plaintiffs want to withhold consent—or “holdout”—and thus 
derail a settlement agreement that is in the group’s best 
interest. 
By conceiving plaintiffs within large-scale litigation as a 
community of sorts, we can draw upon an alternative source of 
obligations: group members’ obligations to one another.  
Assuming that plaintiffs actually form or could form a social 
group—and there is ample evidence that they already do this 
to some extent—then social psychology empirically shows that 
they will demonstrate positive “other-regarding preferences.”22  
They will change their views about distributive and 
procedural justice such that they are no longer principally 
 
Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 
J.L. & COM. 1 (1990); Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, 
and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (2007); Roger H. 
Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69. 
  For examples of those adopting a collective or efficiency-based approach, see JACK B. 
WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 1 (1995); Bruce L. Hay, 
Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479 
(1997); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action 
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1 (1991); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by 
Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987); David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and 
Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996); David 
Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 
B.U. L. REV. 695 (1989).   
  Echoes of autonomy exist in Supreme Court opinions as well.  E.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 755 (1989) (discussing the idea 
of one’s own day in court); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 797 (1985) 
(discussing class members’ rights to notice and opt out).  Still others have recommendations for 
mitigating between these two camps to protect both individual and group interests.  See Edward 
H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13 (1996); 
Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 858 (1994); Francis E. Mcgovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 
1821 (1995); Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918 
(1995); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991).  
Many of these demarcations come from David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and 
Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 914–16, 916 n.3, 916 n.4 (1998). 
 21 E.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 20; Jack B. Weinstein, Adjudicative Justice in a Diverse Mass 
Society, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 385 (2000). 
 22 Nancy R. Buchan et al., Let’s Get Personal: An International Examination of the Influence 
of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other Regarding Preferences, 60 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 374–75 (2006). 
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concerned about achieving the best result for themselves, but 
for the collective group.23  Moreover, group members develop 
and adhere to social norms such as promise-keeping, 
compatibility, social agglomeration, and the desire for means-
end coherence.24  These norms provide the social glue keeping 
the group together and fostering cooperation.  But if we are 
inclined toward this alternative idea or find it worth 
considering further, then we must determine what constitutes 
a litigation community, what obligations follow from 
membership in that community, and how to foster group 
cohesion. 
To determine what constitutes a litigation community, I 
use a flexible umbrella term: “plural subject.”25  Put simply, a 
plural subject is an instance where multiple individuals—a set 
of “I’s”—become a single, plural subject—a “we.”26  As an 
umbrella term, what makes plaintiffs a plural subject can vary 
greatly: litigants might share the same desires, interests, or 
commitments that certain plans should come to fruition; they 
might collectively participate in a joint activity; or they might 
decide to develop a group policy concerning the litigation.27  
For instance, in corresponding with various plaintiffs involved 
with the Vioxx litigation, I came across the Merck Settlement 
Group, an online community committed to public education 
and to understanding Merck’s settlement offer.28  The group’s 
founder and moderator, Al Pennington, describes the group’s 
activities in plural subject—“we”—terms: 
In the first months, we were all united in our efforts to 
study and understand the settlement.  As we began to see 
the inequities in the settlement, we all agreed that we 
needed to bring these inequities to the attention of the 
 
 23 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 4; see also R. Axelrod & WD Hamilton, The Evolution 
of Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE 1390 (1981); Kelly S. Bouras & S.S. Komorita, Group Discussion 
and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1144, 1145 
(1996); Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Cultural Transmission and the Evolution of 
Cooperative Behavior, 10 HUMAN ECOLOGY 325 (1982); Nancy R. Buchan et al., Let’s Get 
Personal: An International Examination of the Influence of Communication, Culture and Social 
Distance on Other Regarding Preferences, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 374–75 (2006); 
Joseph Henrich, Cultural Group Selection, Coevolutionary Processes and Large-Scale 
Cooperation, 53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 3 (2004); N.L. Kerr & C.M. Kaufman-Gilliland, 
Communication, Commitment, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 513, 526–27 (1994); Mark Van Vugt & Claire M. Hart, Social Identity as Social Glue: 
The Origins of Group Loyalty, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 585, 586 (2004). 
 24 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 43. 
 25 I borrow this term from Margaret Gilbert, but do not attach to it the same meaning that she 
does.  MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2000). 
 26 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 21. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Merck Settlement Group page, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MerckSettlement/. 
2009 A NEW WAY FORWARD  173 
public in order to get [its] support to stop the settlement 
and get other plaintiffs to reject the settlement.  We all 
agreed that we had to hit all the blogs we could find and 
talk with anyone in the media who would listen.29 
This group thus shared a commitment to jointly 
understanding the terms of Merck’s offer.  After 
understanding that offer and interpreting it to be contrary to 
their best interests, the members then dedicated themselves 
to preventing the settlement offer from becoming the 
settlement terms. 
The Merck Settlement Group is not an anomaly.  
Plaintiffs regularly band together to create a credible threat to 
the defendant.  Groups may predate the litigation—such as 
labor unions, veterans’ organizations, community 
organizations, and even homeowner’s associations.  Or, the 
litigation itself might bring people together as illustrated by 
the Merck Settlement Group, Asbestos Victims of America, 
and the Dalkon Shield victims’ organizations.30  As one might 
imagine from these examples, plural subjects vary greatly in 
their degree of cohesiveness.  Thus, I use the labels “shared 
cooperative activity” and “shared goals or policies” to describe 
stronger, more cohesive, subsets.31  The more cohesive the 
group, the more likely its members are to incur moral 
obligations to one another not to opt out of their shared 
endeavor.  Thus, voluntary commitments form the basis for 
obligations to other group members.32  Those commitments 
and intentions similarly define group membership.33 
Once plaintiffs decide to do something together such as 
collaborating on discovery requests or sharing scientific 
research on causation, they might decide to work together on 
other things as well.34  They might bargain or negotiate about 
how to best accomplish a desired end or even develop an 
overarching goal or policy to guide their deliberations.  But 
they might not.  The group may fall prey to disruptive forces 
and disagree on key issues.  Discussing issues during group 
formation might turn minor variances into major rifts.  Or, 
 
 29 E-mail from Al Pennington, Moderator of the Merck Settlement Group, to Elizabeth 
Chamblee Burch, Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law (Oct. 20, 
2008, 1:22 a.m. EST) (on file with author); Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 21. 
 30 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 20; see also Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A Peterson, 
Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 
1023 (1993); Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 
2005 UTAH L. REV. 863, 919–21. 
 31 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 23–27. 
 32 Id. at 27. 
 33 See infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 34 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 27. 
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some individual outliers may have no interest in becoming 
group members at all—either because of ignorance or 
deliberate choice.35 
Thus, the key questions become (1) what to do with the 
holdouts, the dissenters, those who join the group but then 
want to exit; (2) what to do with the outliers, those who have 
never joined the group or considered themselves group 
members; and (3) how to mitigate competition among the 
inevitable subgroups that form within large-scale litigation.36  
Answering these questions necessitates an understanding of 
how and when members are obligated to one another.  
Isolating these questions also requires that we initially make 
a few significant assumptions: that the proposed settlement is 
objectively fair (a slippery term with multiple meanings), that 
the litigation has reached a point where collaboration and 
unity among plaintiffs is desirable, and that one can bracket 
the nature and purpose of the tort system and use a pluralist 
perspective.37 
Beginning with the first question—what to do with the 
strategic holdouts—requires that we assume that settlement 
is objectively fair to all of the plaintiffs.  Although it is possible 
that holdouts will experience a change of heart after strong 
encouragement or pressure from the group, the more 
controversial question is when both holdouts and outliers 
must become or remain group members.38  Put differently, 
when are litigants morally or legally obligated to participate 
in and assent to the settlement? 
The legal answer is easier in the class action context.  In 
Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions, class members cannot 
opt out of their “shared” endeavor whether they would like to 
or not.  Allowing opt out rights in those kinds of class actions 
would create inconsistent results or deplete a limited fund, 
leaving some claimants with nothing.39  The Fifth Circuit has 
gone so far as to say that a “presumption of cohesiveness” 
applies in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions.40  Less obligatorily, Rule 
23(b)(3) class members have a chance to exit from class 
membership by opting out.  They thus incur obligations to one 
another only by remaining in the class.  Even this is a fiction 
of sorts—remaining in the class is the default.  It is unlikely 
 
 35 Id. at 30–31. 
 36 Id. at 32. 
 37 Id. at 6, 32. 
 38 Id. at 30–31. 
 39 Id. at 32, 37. 
 40 Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Co., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).  Yet, a detailed look at 
employment discrimination class actions regularly reveals much dissention among the ranks. 
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that the class forms a genuine community.  Instead, the class 
action is a legally coercive force to bind people together when 
the circumstances so require. 
Determining when litigants are obligated to one another 
is even more difficult in nonclass aggregation, like the Zyprexa 
and Vioxx cases.41 Without Rule 23 to clarify the group’s 
boundaries, Judge Weinstein in the Zyprexa litigation and 
later Judge Fallon in the Vioxx case dubbed them “quasi-class 
actions” and relied on equitable doctrines to shape the 
litigation.42  Quasi class actions help address the agency 
problems through judicial oversight, but they, like aggregation 
and consolidation, are externally coercive.  The resulting 
conglomerate is not an organic group; it is judicially and 
procedurally constructed.  Yet, bringing plaintiffs together 
procedurally fosters opportunities for communities to 
develop.43 
Once plaintiffs’ cases are pending in the same forum, it 
may be possible to avoid further externally coercive measures 
by stimulating the development of an actual group that 
evolves organically from relationships, promises, assurances, 
social networks, commitments, and commonalities.44  Social 
and personal norms underlying these connections work hand-
in-hand with moral obligations to address the question of 
when plaintiffs in nonclass litigation are obligated to one 
another as group members.  Although one might adopt 
requirements for incurring obligations that range from those 
used in the class action context to the contractual context, this 
group responsibility approach relies on a stronger requirement 
formed by promises and mutual assurances.45 
Under this approach, plaintiffs involved in nonclass 
aggregation who jointly and voluntarily intend X, who commit 
to one another through promises or assurances, are morally 
obligated to act in accordance with that intention provided 
that no exit conditions to the contrary exist.46  Obligations in 
this sense are initially voluntary and evolve from social 
relationships within the group.  Because intentions demand 
 
 41 As Judge Weinstein notes, ―Federal Rule 23 class actions have been reduced in their 
impact in tort and securities cases.‖  Weinstein, supra note 5, at 18.  The change is due, in large 
part, to the Class Action Fairness Act.  See generally Burch, supra note 2, at 2517. 
 42 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Vioxx 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611–12 (E.D. La. 2008); L. Elizabeth Chamblee [Burch], 
Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class 
Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 241 (2004). 
 43 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 30–31. 
 44 Id. at 36, 43–44. 
 45 Id. at 36–42. 
 46 Id. at 40. 
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means-end coherence and are thereby semi-resistant to 
irrational change, group members sharing intentions routinely 
develop norms of consistency and stability.47 
The intention, however, is not the binding force giving rise 
to the obligation.  Instead, the promises and assurances—the 
commitment itself—morally obligate.48  Promises need not be 
as explicit as saying “I promise;” rather, as evidence law 
illustrates, agreements might be tacit or implicit depending on 
the context.49  These promises and assurances work together 
with relevant norms to bind litigants.  Once the group 
establishes its norms—or invokes preexisting personal or 
social norms—then other members may appeal to the relevant 
norm in their bargaining and reasoning, particularly if the 
norm or promise is violated.50 
This defines membership and explains when and how 
plural subjects are morally obligated to one another to carry 
out their joint intentional activity, but does not propose how 
substantive or procedural laws should reinforce those 
obligations.51  It is possible that once joinder mechanisms 
bring people and cases together, group development will occur 
and social and group norms will prove sufficiently cohesive 
such that legal coercion is unnecessary.  Although this 
Response focuses on this possibility, we should begin to think 
about when and under what circumstances the law should 
reinforce moral obligations once a certain level of moral 
interconnectedness is present.52 
Discussing when litigants are morally obligated to one 
another partially answers the question of what to do with 
holdouts—those dissenters who are initially part of the group 
but then want to exit or to withhold their consent to a 
settlement agreement.53  Moral conditions suggest that 
 
 47 Id. at 41. 
 48 Of course, this moral duty is different from a legal duty.  Although these moral standards 
influenced contract law, promises in and of themselves are not legally enforceable.  See generally 
HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS §1:2 (2008); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent 
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 296 (1986) (―A moral obligation that is not also a 
valid legal obligation can only be legitimately secured by voluntary means.  That is, one may 
have a moral obligation to do something, but unless there is also a valid legal obligation, one 
cannot legitimately be forced by another to do it.‖).  Promises might be enforceable under the 
equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel if the promise induces reliance and not enforcing the 
promise causes injury or injustice. 
 49 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 38; FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B). 
 50 Of course, the norm itself may be that of promise-keeping in which case the norm would 
reinforce the commitment. 
 51 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 41. 
 52 My future work in this area will explore this possibility. 
 53 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 11–14.  I should note that there are many perfectly 
legitimate and understandable reasons that litigants do not consent to certain settlement 
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holdouts who have made promises and assurances to other 
group members are obligated to keep their promises.  If they 
defect, then other members can appeal to the norm of promise-
keeping or alternative relevant norms to encourage 
compliance.  Granted, problems of accurately identifying 
promises, of reading litigants’ fluctuating intentions and 
mindsets, and of enforcing amorphous commitments arise.54 
As mentioned shortly, one possibility is to make those 
obligations explicit and legally binding through an intra-
claimant governance agreement. 
 
II     FOSTERING GROUP DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION 
 
In some ways, relying on group and social norms to 
enforce moral obligations puts the cart before the horse.  To 
answer more fully the question of what to do with holdouts 
and outliers (those plaintiffs who do not consider themselves 
group members) and to address competition between 
plaintiffs’ groups, we must first determine how the judicial 
system should foster group development.  This Part thus 
suggests: (1) using special officers to promote goal 
identification and mediate differences among subgroup 
members, and (2) using intra-claimant governance agreements 
to memorialize commitments and establish group decision-
making procedures.  While these remain preliminary 
observations subject to further development and revision, they 
retain ample flexibility for tailoring process to the unique 
circumstances presented by various mass torts.  As illustrated 
by Judge Weinstein’s array of cases, there is no effective one-
size-fits-all approach.  Thus, any theoretical framework must 
be elastic enough to accomodate judicial tailoring.  
Accordingly, this Part highlights the nuts and bolts of 
cultivating group development and group cohesion, thereby 
tilling the soil for the resulting group to develop obligations to 
one another. 
Findings from social psychology and even evolutionary 
biology suggest that once people view one another as group 
members,55 their principal concern is no longer the self, but 
 
arrangements.  Perhaps the agreement sweeps the wrongdoing under the rug and the litigant wants 
publicity and public education.  Accordingly, I am making a very broad and—in the real world—
hotly contested assumption that the settlement is objectively fair and that the holdout is trying to 
garner more money for herself without a legitimate basis. 
 54 Id. at 42. 
 55 As noted above, by ―members,‖ I do not mean those who have simply filed their own claim 
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the group’s collective welfare.56  Thus, once we realize that 
plural subjects incur moral obligations to one another under 
certain circumstances and that group members exhibit 
prosocial behaviors, then we should explore ways that the 
judicial system can facilitate (or at least not inhibit) organic 
group development.   
As noted, when the group’s existence does not predate the 
litigation, procedural aggregation frequently brings litigants’ 
cases to the same forum before the same judge.  Although that 
clustering effect does not, in and of itself, translate into a 
community, the proximity might catalyze group formation.  
Variables stimulating group formation and cohesion include 
physical and social immediacy; recognized homogeneity of 
goals, norms, values, or intentions; and shared experiences.57  
Destabilizing influences include competition, heterogeneous 
claims and damages, few shared life-defining experiences, few 
overlapping intentions, disparate and incompatible litigation 
goals, and greater geographic dispersion.58  Consequently, 
bringing litigants’ cases together in the same forum can create 
the physical or social proximity that dispersed mass torts—
such as product liability suits—typically lack. For instance, 
the Merck Settlement Group, the Asbestos Victims of America, 
and the Dalkon Shield victims’ organizations all coalesced 
after coordinated pretrial handling. 
Still, many litigants—even those within groups that 
predate the litigation—sue the same defendant without 
intending to do so cooperatively.59  Take, for example, the 
Vietnam veterans’ organizations (Agent Orange Victims 
International, Citizen Soldier, and Vietnam Veterans of 
America), which divided ideologically over leadership, politics, 
and views about the Vietnam War.60  Competition with one 
another for veterans’ allegiance resulted in fractured 
organizational and litigation efforts.61  Large-scale nonclass 
litigation is particularly likely to experience this kind of 
subgroup formation and subsequent competition over 
resources, litigants, strategies, and goals.62  Accordingly, as 
Judge Weinstein recognizes, bringing litigants together 
 
against what turns out to be the same defendant; rather, ―group members,‖ refers to plural 
subjects who have incurred moral obligations to one another. 
 56 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 57 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 16. 
 58 Id. at 16. 
 59 Id. at 24. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 27–29. 
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procedurally is only the beginning.63 
Once their cases are aggregated, plaintiffs might: (1) 
realize that they share litigation goals and that collaborating 
results in cost-savings and more credible threats, or (2) divide 
or stay divided as did the veterans’ groups involved in Agent 
Orange.  The strength of this first proposition is that it 
capitalizes on the benefits of other-regarding preferences and 
thereby makes holdouts less likely.  Giving litigants an 
opportunity to cooperate with one another and to recognize 
agreement on certain litigation activities can strengthen group 
cohesion.64  In fact, one of the most robust findings in the 
social psychology literature is that when a group discusses a 
dilemma, they are substantially more likely to cooperate with 
one another.65  Once plaintiffs cooperate on one activity, they 
might decide to collaborate on other litigation-related matters; 
they might find that group cohesiveness and their normative 
story go hand in hand.66  Accordingly, facilitating 
opportunities for litigants to determine and discuss their 
litigation ends and move from amorphous intentions to 
practical goals may help them acheive a better result than 
striking out on their own.67 
Designing opportunities for group deliberation fosters 
intra-group stability and increases cooperation by eliciting 
social norms such as promise-keeping, compatibility, non-
abandonment, and means-end coherence.68  It also provides an 
occasion for a leader to interpret and translate the situation 
into a familiar schema, to ensure procedural fairness, and to 
invoke the appropriate social norm: cooperating is the “right 
thing to do,” one should “keep their promises,” or “we should 
defect and opt out.”69  Allowing the group to design and 
implement its own procedures—perhaps through an intra-
claimant governance agreement—enhances cooperation, 
judgments about the procedure’s fairness, and judgments 
about the fairness of the substantive outcome.70  Giving 
participants an opportunity to voice their opinions about the 
 
 63 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 5, at 7 (appointing ―settlement masters‖ in the Agent 
Orange litigation). 
 64 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 24–25. 
 65 Id. at 44. 
 66 Id. at 25. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 43. 
 69 Id. at 43–44; see also Burch, supra note 4, at 1. 
 70 Burch, supra note 4, at 38; see also TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION 
IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 74–75 
(2000); Linda Musante et al., The Effects of Control on Perceived Fairness of Procedures and 
Outcomes, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 223, 237–38 (1983). 
180 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO  2009 
decision-making and allocation process fosters belongingness 
and cooperation.71 
Discussing a dilemma facing the group in and of itself 
raises concern and awareness for fellow group members.72  
Plus, the personal norms associated with promising regularly 
compel promisors to follow through with their commitments.73  
Even though the default presumption—even in newly formed 
groups—is to cooperate and trust the others involved, binding 
pledges to cooperate are even more effective.74  Consequently, 
an intra-claimant governance agreement that not only 
memorializes the decision-making procedures but also the 
promises elicited as the result of communication, compromise, 
and assurances, may maximize prosocial cooperative 
behaviors.75  In short, deliberation and mutual assurances 
might entice the would-be holdout to develop other-regarding 
preferences such that her concerns extend to achieving equity 
for the collective group.  Moreover, these opportunities may 
similarly afford outliers—those plaintiffs on the outskirts of 
the litigation who are not group members—the chance and 
incentive to join the group, gain common knowledge, 
collaborate on litigation goals, and form reciprocal 
obligations.76 
Turning now to the second proposition—the idea that 
subgroups could polarize and compete with one another—
requires us to recognize that at some point competing groups 
in large-scale litigation need to connect and coalesce, the 
litigation clusters need to be smaller, or we need to design exit 
mechanisms.77  After all, in the class action context, objectors, 
opt-outs, and subclasses are common.  Further, as the class 
context illustrates, it is possible for group dynamics to produce 
anti-social behaviors.  In these instances, emergent group 
behavior may need to be managed based on our normative 
goals.  Accordingly, I focus here on the possibility of 
connecting and coalescing competing subgroups, though I 
remain open to the idea of smaller litigation clusters—
“polycentric litigation”—and to designing exit mechanisms.78 
 
 71 Burch, supra note 4, at passim. 
 72 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 45. 
 73 Id. at 45–46. 
 74 Id. at 46; see also X. Chen & S.S. Komorita, The Effects of Communication and 
Commitment in a Public Goods Social Dilemma, 60 ORGAN. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION 
PROCESSES 367–86 (1994). 
 75 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 46. 
 76 Id. at 47. 
 77 Id. 
 78 I find the idea worth further consideration, but recognize that doing so necessitates 
rethinking the preclusion doctrines and use of the All Writs Act.  I’ve discussed the idea in 
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By emphasizing the subgroups’ commonalities and 
minimizing their distinctions (called “salient social 
categorization”), a “special officer” appointed by the court to 
mediate between feuding plaintiffs’ factions could encourage 
plaintiffs to reconceptualize the aggregate as one 
superordinate group.79  In this way, special officers could serve 
as a go-between for competing plaintiffs.80  Because plaintiffs’ 
attorneys regularly (and appropriately) act as zealous 
advocates, most of the information that plaintiffs receive is 
filtered through that lens.  Accordingly, plaintiffs often lack 
the information necessary to make fully informed judgments.  
Thus, a special officer could provide claimants with missing 
information, such as the strength of their claims vis-à-vis 
others.  Moreover, the special officer could work with 
competing subgroups to design collective decision-making 
procedures that detail the conditions and circumstances for 
exit and voice.81 
Bringing litigants together in small discussion groups 
humanizes the process by giving them an opportunity to meet 
one another.  For instance, Francis McGovern served as a 
special master in the Rhode Island nightclub fire that killed 
one hundred people and injured more than two hundred.82  By 
holding twenty-one group meetings with over three-hundred 
victims and their families, plaintiffs could see those who were 
severely disfigured, those who suffered from losing a loved 
one, and those who were less directly impacted.83  By asking 
 
Litigating Groups, ALABAMA L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 47–48, available at 
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cmt. a, §3.09, cmt. a (November, 2008 draft).  The meaning attributed to ―special officer‖ by the 
ALI is synonymous with my use of the term here.  Other scholars have also suggested the use of a 
mediator or special master for large-scale litigation.  See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking 
the Mass out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender, and Process, 31 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 513 (1998); Deborah 
R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587 (1995); Francis E. McGovern, The 
Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 72 (Autumn, 1990); Francis E. 
McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1378 
(2005); Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay and Much 
Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196 (2003). 
 80 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 allows federal courts to appoint special masters. 
 81 See Paula W. Potter, Procedural Justice and Voice Effects, 10 J. ORG. CULTURE, COMM. & 
CONFLICT 33, 33–34 (2006) (―Research has consistently shown that granting individuals the 
opportunity to voice their preferences and opinions during the decision-making process increases 
fairness judgments.‖). 
 82 Tracy Breton, Station Lawyers Recommend Guardian, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Aug. 1, 
2008, at 1. 
 83 Id.; Burch, supra note 4, at 23. 
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each person about their preferred litigation outcome and 
presenting various compensation distribution models used in 
past disasters, he fostered group deliberation and cohesion.84 
Similarly, Judge Weinstein appointed Ken Feinberg as a 
“settlement master” in the DES cases85 and used Feinberg and 
David I. Shapiro as special masters in the Agent Orange 
litigation.86  Ken Feinberg also acted as the special master in 
the September 11 Compensation Fund, where he traveled to 
different jurisdictions across the country and conducted 
countless town hall meetings in schools, community centers, 
and hotels.87  This afforded victims some degree of procedural 
justice by allowing them to participate in an on-going 
discussion and to tell their story.  Feinberg credits this aspect 
of the process as “the essential reason that the program was so 
successful.”88  The 97% participation rate tends to confirm his 
claim.89 
These regional discussions make group formation, 
discussion, and cooperation feasible in both small-scale and 
large-scale litigation.90  The idea of using a special officer in 
this way simultaneously retains the necessary flexibility to 
accommodate the unique aspects of each mass tort.  Of course, 
the idea of using a special officer, settlement master, or special 
master is not new.91  What is different, however, is using a 
special officer to mediate solely or at least principally between 
feuding plaintiffs’ groups and to facilitate collaboration and 
development of group decision-making procedures that might 
be embodied in an intra-claimant governance agreement. 
Encouraging groups to discuss the dilemmas facing them 
fosters group cohesion.  And cohesive groups provide a more 
durable solution to the challenges inherent in collective 
 
 84 Burch, supra note 4, at 23–24. 
 85 In re New York Co. DES Litig., 142 F.R.D. 58, 59 (1992). 
 86 In re ―Agent Orange‖ Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 87 Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 50. 
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 91 Other scholars have also suggested the use of a mediator or special master for large-scale 
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Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. 
REV. 1587 (1995); Francis E. McGovern, The Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 72 (Autumn, 1990); Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims 
Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1378 (2005); Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist 
Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay and Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196 (2003). 
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litigation, particularly client-client and attorney-client 
conflicts.  This focus on group cohesion reallocates power to 
the plaintiffs themselves.  Unlike most scholarship on this 
topic, this Response does not concede or assume that the 
attorney rightly acts as the fulcrum in aggregate litigation.92  
The attorney’s role and the power imbalance it creates is the 
principal cause of many of the conflicts in nonclass 
aggregation.  And yet, much of aggregate litigation would 
never begin without entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys 
acting as private attorneys general.  Consequently, 
strengthening group cohesion post-aggregation can restore the 
tether between the group and its agent and better situate the 
group to monitor the litigation.93  Allowing the group itself to 
design and implement fair procedures for group deliberation, 
collective decision-making, and allocation provides procedural 
justice components that large-scale court-based litigation 
typically lacks. 
It also suggests, at least in some ways, a return to the 
communal obligations from which the class action emerged.  
As developed by Stephen Yeazell, the modern-day class action 
can be traced back to medieval guilds, where community 
members shared collectively in the duties, obligations, and 
privileges of “villeinage” membership.94  All community 
members were jointly liable for any duty that was principally 
assigned to just one person.95  The courts regularly imposed 
collective liability on villages for these obligations regardless 
of who bore individual responsibility.96  Of course, with the 
increase of technology and mobility, our modern-day society 
often lacks the interpersonal relationships that form 
community bonds.  But sociation still occurs—it ranges from 
simply walking together, to developing friendships, to building 
families, to less personal activities such as staying in the same 
hotel.97  Thus, it seems, at least in some ways, that the way 
forward calls us to modernize, strengthen, and reinvigorate 
certain community ideals inherent in medieval times. 
In sum, even if we disagree about when obligations arise 
or how to enforce the content of those obligations, I urge us all 
to think about how communal and group obligations can and 
 
 92 Burch, supra note 7, at 7. 
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 94 YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 41–48; see also Burch, supra note 7, manuscript at 17. 
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do impact litigants.  This alternative way of thinking means 
that the content of litigants’ rights and duties may not depend 
solely on what maximizes the general welfare or what 
preserves litigants’ individual autonomy, but also on what 
follows from plaintiffs’ membership in a particular group. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I share Judge Weinstein’s pessimism that appellate courts 
are hostile to class actions and other devices for efficient 
administration of mass litigation, but I am less convinced than 
he that administrative agencies are the right way forward.  As 
I have written in the past, administrative agencies introduce a 
new host of problems including the stigma of being less 
legitimate than their judicial counterparts.98  Moreover, so 
long as mass torts continue to be used as venue for social 
policy debates, they should not be relegated to the bowels of 
administrative processing.99  The system must retain the 
transparency necessary to serve both its public and private 
ends. 
Although this Response takes issue with Judge 
Weinstein’s contention that much of complex litigation should 
“fall on the shoulders of administrative agencies” and instead 
suggests the alternative proposal of using special officers and 
moral obligations, difficult work remains in fully formulating 
that proposal.  This account is currently incomplete; the devil 
is, as always, in the details.  Future scholarship must craft 
feasible procedures to promote cooperation, decide when and 
how to impose sanctions when norms and moral obligations 
fail, determine when exiting the group is appropriate, and 
contemplate how to accomplish that departure in the best way 
possible.  Moreover, the barebones structure as sketched here 
and more fully developed in Litigating Groups requires 
further development to take into account non-reciprocal, non-
proportional obligations.  If we think of a group as an 
interconnected set of individuals, some of those individuals 
will have obligations to others within the group that are 
inapplicable to the group as a whole.  Only some obligations 
are reciprocal, and only some are proportional. 
If we begin to think about nonclass aggregation as a 
 
 98 See Burch, supra note 2, at 2533–36. 
 99 To be sure, this same criticism can be levied at confidential settlements within the current 
system. 
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system with a panoply of interactions between agents, rules, 
procedures, and institutions, then we can better evaluate the 
ripple effect of change.  Grappling with what constitutes a 
litigation community and what obligations flow from 
membership within that community is just one small piece of 
the puzzle for institutional design.  But it is a critical 
component.  It has the potential to enable the litigants 
themselves to do some of the heavy lifting rather than 
requiring hefty doses of judicial coercion.  And understanding 
the system and the group dynamics within it may enable us 
eventually to design and employ a process that more 
effectively equalizes litigating power.100 
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